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ARTICLES




You are watching television and during a string of commercials you
view a man dressed in biker leathers and boots expounding his legal
specialty with respect to motorcycle accidents. "I am an attorney. I also
ride bikes, and therefore I know best about the legal problems associated
with motorcycle ownership and accidents." He even has a nice catchy
telephone number that is placed across the bottom half of the TV screen for
the entire 30 second commercial: "1-800-4BIKERS." Though a large
number of Californians are lawyers by profession, the majority of people
are not savvy in the legal field. In fact, it is safe to assume that most
people feel very intimidated when they are required to come in contact with
attorneys.
You are a motorcycle rider and you have recently been in an accident.
You are injured and cannot work. You have no idea where to begin...
and then you hear these magic words one day while at home recuperating:
"I am an attorney, and I ride bikes. Been in a motorcycle accident? Call
1-800-4BIKERS for a free consultation. No fees unless you recover."
Well, you think to yourself, I have nothing to lose. If he doesn't win the
case, I owe nothing. Plus, he's a motorcycle accident specialist. Sounds
great!
* The author is an associate with the Los Angeles firm of Hill Wynne Troop & Meisinger.
Ms. Brooks received her J.D. from Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
Ms. Brooks would like to express her sincere appreciation and gratitude to Professor Gary
Williams of Loyola Law School, Los Angeles for his invaluable comments and assistance.
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The reality is that more and more attorneys are advertising in this
fashion.' Yet, for a great many non-advertising attorneys, the above
hypothetical advertisement is embarrassing, especially today as the public's
perception of attorneys has greatly diminished. Still, the question of
attorney advertising is not easy to address.
It has been over sixteen years since the Supreme Court ruled that
states may not impose blanket prohibitions on advertising by lawyers and
other professionals.2 However, the issue remains alive today as attorneys
and state bar associations continue to be divided by their beliefs. Many
lawyers consider the ability to advertise a blessing. Still many others are
convinced that at least some advertising is a primary cause of the
profession's image problems. In fact, Lonny D. Morrison, President of the
State Bar of Texas has stated, "I don't think anything has had such a
detrimental effect on the image of lawyers as advertising."3
On the other hand, there are lawyers who believe that advertising is
key to informing the public, as well as improving access to legal services,
especially for the poor.4 Sara-Ann Determan, Chairperson of the American
Bar Association ("ABA") Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal
Services, stated that "[i]f something is in bad taste, it's a small price to pay
for increasing access [to legal services]." 5 Determan reiterated that the
Supreme Court has said states can only prohibit advertising that is false,
misleading or deceptive.6 Burnele V. Powell, Chairperson of the ABA
Standing Committee on Professional Discipline and a professor at the
University of North Carolina School of Law in Chapel Hill, further stated
that "advertising serves a useful purpose ... [it] gives people information
that they can use to pursue their own interests. That is something this
profession has always championed." 7
This Article will present a historical perspective of attorney advertis-
ing and discuss its protection under the First Amendment. In addition, a
recent Supreme Court case dealing with CPA advertising and Iowa's
1. American Bar Association, Report on the Survey on the Image of Lawyers in Advertising
(Comm'n on Advertising), Jan. 1990, at 2. "According to the Television Bureau of Advertising,
nearly $47 million was spent on legal services advertising on television in 1986... " This
figure was up $10 million from the previous year indicating a continuing trend. Id.
2. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
3. James Podgers, Image Problem, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 67.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.; see also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
7. See Podgers, supra note 3, at 67.
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restrictive attorney advertising statutes is analyzed under current standards.
Finally, this Article discusses possible solutions to the advertising problem.
IX. THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF ATTORNEYS:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Attorney During The Classical Period
The origin of the legal profession can be traced back to medieval
England.8 But, the development of the attitude regarding the inappropri-
ateness of overt pursuit of clients has its origin in ancient Greek and
Roman law.9
In ancient Greece, a legal controversy was believed to concern only
the judge and the persons actually involved in the underlying transaction.'
Members of this society felt that outside interference in the legal process
was inappropriate, although it was understood that friends and relatives
could accompany a litigant to trial and render assistance." As time
passed, a litigant who was escorted to court surrounded by supporters was
perceived to be a person of power and dignity, and a person not so
supported was pitied.12
However, by the sixth century B.C., the practice of intervention on
behalf of a friendless litigant became abused.'3 The intervenor became
known as a "sycophant," an individual who voluntarily undertook the
prosecution of a matter motivated by money, prestige, means of political
agitation, or as a means to harass other litigants.' 4 As a result, disinterest-
ed intervenors were looked upon with suspicion and often were required to
invent or allege some private interest in a matter in order to avoid a charge
of sycophancy or abuse of process.'
5
During ancient Roman times, the disinterested intervenor also endured
an aura of distrust. 16  Even though advocacy became a recognized
profession during the Republic, the counselor was required to maintain the
8. RoscoE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUrY To MODERN TnvIES 78 (1953).
9. See generally FREDRICK W. MArrLAND Er AL., A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
37-42 (1978).
10. See Max Radin, Maintenance By Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48 (1935).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 49.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 48.
16. Id
19941
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pretense of a personal connection with the proceedings. 7 The sycophancy
of Greece was termed "calumnia" under the Roman system.' 8 The
calumniator was viewed as one who brought unfounded or trivial actions
and society still believed that a legal controversy concerned only persons
actually involved in the transaction.19 This general attitude coupled with
the skepticism felt for disinterested intervenors naturally discouraged the
overt pursuit of business by people seeking to render legal services.20
B. The Attorney In English History
In England, as in early Greece and Rome, representation in litigation
developed slowly and was rare.2 ' Similarly, it was the custom to take
friends and advisors to trial. 22 Trial in medieval England was perilous, in
that trial by battle,' or judicial combat, was often implemented as a form
of dispute resolution.24 In trial by battle, the accuser had until nightfall
to'prove, by his body, the truth of his charge.2 If unable to accomplish
this, not by death, but by making the accused cry "craven," the accuser was
deemed a pejurer.26 The intervening champion-for-hire, maintaining a
fiction of personal connection with the proceedings, purported to serve as
a witness asserting that he knew the truth of the cause for which he was
fighting.27 This professional champion-for-hire, motivated by money,
represented an interference in the legal proceedings and was disapproved
of by society.
28
Over time, trial by battle became obsolete. The English judicial
system evolved into a system where legal expertise lay with a small
17. Id.
18. Id. at 52-53.
19. Id. at 53.
20. Louise L. Hill, Solicitation By Lawyers: Piercing the First Amendment Veil, 42 ME. L.
REV. 369, 370-73 (1990).
21. POUND, supra note 8, at 79.
22. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 12 (1953).
23. In trial by battle, one would swear to the truth of his cause and, in personal battle,
attempt to prove his position. Representation was also a part of this process in that in certain
situations a person could retain a champion to intervene on his behalf. Initially, champions were
used where the litigant was blind, disabled, elderly, or an infant, woman, or priest. Nevertheless,
over time, champions were freely used by every class of litigants and some people even
permanently maintained them. FREDRICK W. MAITLAND ET AL., A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 37-42 (1978).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 50.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 37-42.
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number of persons whose experience developed from the earlier accompa-
niment of litigants to trial.29 These legal specialists remained a suspicious
class because of the old prejudice against representation, as well as the
perception that these advocates encouraged vexatious and profit-seeking
lawsuits.3" Nevertheless, the legal system continued to develop, which led
to a necessary increased skill and education level of legal practitioners.3'
Thus, reliance on these legal specialists, who now openly acted on behalf
of others, naturally followed. It is from this medieval period that the legal
profession as it is known today resulted.32
The law came to be regarded as a learned profession, along with
medicine and theology, and training in the law became more formalized.33
The professions were distinguishable from craft and trade associations by
parameters of society, wealth, and education.34 Members of the profes-
sions were generally men from leading families who trained in the classics
rather than in elaborate apprenticeship programs. 35 Professionals had little
regard for the competition and caveat emptor of the crafts because they
were not completely dependent upon their professions for their liveli-
hood.36
Lawyers were few in number and formed a closely knit group, as was
the general practice of the other specialized craftsmen's associations.37
Many lawyers of the time considered the legal profession a public service,
rather than a business.38 Afraid of being referred to as tradesmen, lawyers
refused to compete for clients for fear of ruining their intimacy amongst
their colleagues.39 Further, it was unnecessary for lawyers to actively
pursue clients because there were very few legal experts and many
clients.4" Thus, the principles of etiquette and good taste of the class of
legal professionals, along with the existence of readily available business,
29. DRINKER, supra note 22, at 79.
30. Radin, supra note 10, at 59.
31. POUND, supra note 8, at 78.
32. Id.
33. STEPHEN RUBIN, The Legal Web of Professional Regulation, in REGULATING THE
PROFESSION 29, 32 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., Sept. 28, 1980).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. DRINKER, supra note 22, at 5.
37. RUBIN, supra note 33, at 32.
38. POUND, supra note 8, at 5; see also DRINKER, supra note 22, at 5.
39. Paul H. Francis & Jennifer J. Johnson, The Emperor's Old Clothes: Piercing The Bar's
Ethical Veil, 13 WILLAMEiTE L. REV. 221, 224 (1976).
40. Id.
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led to the attitude that solicitation of business was unnecessary.41 As
such, client solicitation was not an issue and thus not practiced.
C. The Attorney in the United States
In colonial America, it was customary for young men desiring to be
members of the legal profession to travel to England to study law.42 Due
to their training and community positions, these men established high
standards of education and performance for the legal profession.43 As in
England, the number of trained lawyers in colonial America was small and
the factors which discouraged overt client seeking activity in England
carried over to the colonies.'
In America, lawyers played a significant role in the formative period
of the Republic. 45  However, as the new nation began to grow, a wide-
spread perception developed among the public that special privileges were
accorded to members of the professions.46 Consequently, a hostility
developed toward the regulated professions, particularly the legal profes-
sion.47  Bar associations, viewed as exclusive and secret trade unions,
were perceived as undemocratic and un-American. 48 As a result, states
enacted significant legislation which lowered or eliminated qualifications
of character, education, and training.49 By 1860, only nine of thirty-nine
states required a definite, though nominal, period of preparation for
admission to the bar."0
In the nineteenth century, the bar in the United States was essentially
open, and this greatly enlarged group of lawyers competed for business
insufficient to accommodate their number.5 The competition among so
41. Id.
42. FRANCIS R. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: SOME SELECTED
PHASES 32 (1969).
43. DRINKER, supra note 22, at 19.
44. Deborah L. Rhode, Solicitation, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 317-18 (1986).
45. Twenty-five of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence were lawyers, as
were thirty-one of the fifty-five members of the Constitutional Convention. 29 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITrANICA 217-18 (15th ed. 1988).
46. DRINKER, supra note 22, at 19.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. A number of states (Indiana (1850), Michigan (1850), New Hampshire (1842), Maine
(1843), and Wisconsin (1849)) passed statutes and even amended their constitutions upholding
the inherent and "natural" right of every voter of good moral character to practice law. Id. at n.
38.,
50. See id.
51. See DRINKER, supra note 22.
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many "professionals" led to the onset of lawyer advertising and solicita-
tion." In fact, Abraham Lincoln attempted to attract clients by running
the following ad in the August 10, 1838 Sangamo Journal: "STUART &
LINCOLN, Attorneys and Counsellors at Law, will practice, conjointly, in
the Courts of this Judicial Circuit - Office No. 4 Hoffman's Row,
upstairs. Springfield." 3
Legal practitioners were no longer a small homogeneous group who
shunned the overt pursuit of clients. During the latter part of the nineteenth
century, leaders of the bar, whbo were predominantly business lawyers,
attempted to stop commercialism in the as yet unregulated legal profes-
sion.54 To achieve this end, the leaders of the bar sought to reestablish
standards of character, education, and training within the profession,
continuing to hold firm to the belief that passivity and patience were a
lawyer's cardinal virtues.5 This ideology ran counter to the opinions of
the newly emerging "class" of less educated attorneys who did not favor
allowing business to seek the attorney.
It is postulated that reform was also sought because a business crisis,
in the form of competition, was perceived.56 In the past, the class of legal
professionals had no need to advertise. Most lawyers were general
practitioners in small towns and legal services were rendered in an intimate
relationship based upon the lawyer's reputation in the community.5 7 As
such, an attorney would prosper as long as his reputation was one of strong
character, education, and training. However, once the states enacted laws
allowing virtually anyone to become a lawyer, the influx of attorneys
impacted the seasoned attorney's livelihood.58 As a result, bar associa-
tions throughout the country were reorganized by these veteran attorneys
in order to fight back against this perceived crisis.
59
In 1887, the Alabama State Bar Association formulated and adopted
the first formal code of ethics for the American legal profession.6 The
Alabama Code of Ethics ("Alabama Code") stressed the need for high
52. See generally LOR B. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND
SOLICrrATION (1980).
53. Id. at 1.
54. DRINKER, supra note 22, at 12.
55. Id.
56. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 649 (2d ed. 1985).
57. LORI B. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION
(1980).
58. See generally id.
59. DRINKER, supra note 22, at 12.
60. Id. at 23.
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moral principles, and addressed the matter of lawyer advertising.6' The
Alabama Code stated that "[n]ewspaper advertisements, circulars and
business cards, tending professional services to the general public, are
proper; but special solicitation of particular individuals to become clients
ought to be avoided. 62 As such, within the first formal code of ethics,
lawyer advertising was not condemned, but solicitation of clients was
proscribed.
Subsequently, in 1908, the ABA promulgated and adopted the Canons
of Professional Ethics ("Canons") to govern its members. The Canons
were adopted in whole or in part throughout the United States.63 Howev-
er, while the Alabama Code allowed attorney advertising, the Canons did
not.64
This broad prohibition on advertising by the ABA was based on
several considerations. First, the law being deemed a profession, not a
trade, embraced the "cherished" tradition of the English barristers. This
tradition was essential to the lawyer's respect for his chosen profession, as
well as respect for his fellow lawyers.65 Second, weakening public
opinion called for a definite statement by the bar of the accepted rules of
professional conduct.
66
Furthermore, the ABA believed that advertising and solicitation did
not benefit either the public or the attorney in the same way as in the case
of the sale of merchandise.67  In fact, such practice was believed to
increase unnecessary litigation. 68  Also, extensive advertising was
considered against public policy because it tended to commercialize the
profession.69 More interesting, however, was the concern with safe-
guarding potential clients against deception on the part of the unscrupulous
attorney who might lure such clients through improper advertising.70
61. See 188 ALA. XXIII-XXXIV (1899).
62. Id. at XXM, Rule 16 (emphasis added).
63. DRINKER, supra note 22, at 25. "[I]n 1908, there were forty-four state associations,
twelve of which had adopted formal codes of professional ethics .... By 1914, thirty-one had
adopted the American Bar Association Code, with little or no change; Michigan, Virginia,
Mississippi, Missouri, and North Carolina had adopted it in place of their own existing codes."
Id.
64. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICs Canon 27 (1908).
65. DRINKER, supra note 22, at 12.
66. Id. at 25.
67. Id. at 211.
68. Id. at 212.
69. Id.; see also notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
70. DRINKER, supra note 22, at 212.
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The lawyers associated with the ABA who formulated and imple-
mented the Canons were primarily commercial lawyers who represented
large clients, rather than the smaller, less dignified practitioners." At that
time, membership in the ABA was selective. In 1900, just 1.3 percent of
the country's lawyers were members, and grew to only 3 percent by
1910.72 Thus, it is not surprising that the proscriptions against advertising
and solicitation did not impact the practice of the well established lawyer,
but rather worked to the disadvantage of the small law firm and solo
practitioner who had problems procuring clients.73 The Canons, and their
proscription against advertising and solicitation, remained intact for six
decades. Ultimately, these proscriptions were carried over to the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code") which replaced the
Canons in 1969. 74 This occurred even though the question had arisen as
to whether this prohibition worked to defend the values of the profession
or "to mask the self-seeking stratagems of a conservative elite.
' 75
The Model Code, as originally passed in 1969, contained disciplinary
rules prohibiting advertising and solicitation that were similar to the
proscriptions in the Canons.76 However, it became apparent to the
members of the bar that an absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising was
inappropriate.77 Consumer awareness was increasing and the public
sought more information regarding the availability of legal services.78
Also, the Supreme Court was analyzing the First Amendment interests
against restrictions placed on speech.79 As such, the ABA amended the
Model Code six times, eventually allowing lawyer advertising. However,
the Model Code took a restrictive approach, known as the "laundry list"
approach, and explicitly designated the information which lawyers could
71. FRIEDMAN, supra note 56, at 651; JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 41-42
(1976).
72. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW, THE LAW MAKERS 287,
289 (1950).
73. AUERBACH, supra note 71, at 42-43.
74. MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876
348 (1976).
75. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-101, 2-103, 2-104, 2-105
(1980).
76. Id.
77. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 74, at 349.
78. Beginning in the mid-1960s, states began to enact legislation to protect consumers
against unfair and deceptive commercial practices. By 1981, forty seven states provided the
public with a private right of action to recover for alleged violations of such laws. TANG THANH
LE, PROTECTNG CONSUMER RIGHTS 21 (1987).
79. See generally Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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use in publications regarding their services.8 0 Nevertheless, solicitation
continued to be prohibited.
As a result of the Model Code being criticized as irrelevant,
ambiguous and contradictory, the ABA appointed a special commission to
examine it.8' This resulted in the ABA's adoption of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") in 1983. The Model Rules enlarged
the sphere of acceptable lawyer advertising in the face of the Supreme
Court's response to restrictions on speech and the view that the public
sought information. Rather than approach lawyer advertising from a
regulatory format of the laundry list, the drafters of the Model Rules chose
to approach the matter more liberally, prohibiting only false or misleading
communications.8"
Following the adoption of the Model Rules by the ABA, most of the
individual states, which operate as separate jurisdictions, adopted the Model
Rules in their entirety or with some modification.8 3 As they stand, the
Model Rules represent the primary standard by which the conduct of a
lawyer is judged.
Hm. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING AND FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
In 1976, the Supreme Court extended the protection of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution to commercial speech.
84
One year later, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review commer-
cial speech protection in the context of attorney advertising. The result
was the extension of commercial speech protection to advertisements
disseminated by lawyers. Thus, legal advertising could no longer be
subject to blanket suppression. 6
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,87 two attorneys placed an advertise-
ment offering legal services at "very reasonable fees," and listed the costs
of certain services, violating the Arizona rule prohibiting any form of
attorney advertising.88 The Supreme Court held that a state may not
80. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REPONSIBILrrY DR 2-101(B) (1980).
81. See Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 702 (1977).
82. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 (1992).
83. Over two-thirds of the states have adopted the Model Rules to date. Id. at viii.
84. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
85. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
86. Id. at 383.
87. Id. at 350.
88. Id. at 354-55.
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prevent the publication in a newspaper of a truthful advertisement
concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services.89 The
Court relied on the fact that the relevant Arizona disciplinary rule at issue
served to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and kept the
public uninformed.' Further, the Court reasoned that the failure of
attorneys to advertise may create an image that the profession fails to reach
out and serve the community.91
The decision in Bates, that attorney advertising cannot be subject to
blanket suppression, represented a major step towards the deregulation of
attorney advertising. However, the narrowly construed holding continued
to allow for some advertising regulation such as restraining false, deceptive,
or misleading advertisements, as well as restraint on the time, place, and
manner of advertising. 92 -Since Bates, the Supreme Court has tended to
reject prophylactic rules relating to attorney advertising as violative of the
First Amendment.93
In undertaking the analysis of the commercial speech of attorneys, the
Supreme Court distinguished lawyer advertising from in-person lawyer
solicitation, the latter deemed impermissible.94 In a 1980 case that did not
involve lawyer advertising, the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission95 formulated a four-part test
for determining the constitutionality of a restriction on commercial speech:
(1) The speech must not be misleading and it must concern
lawful activity;
(2) the asserted state interest promoted by the restriction must
be substantial;
(3) the restriction must directly advance the asserted state
interest; and
(4) the restriction must not be more extensive than necessary
to serve the asserted state interest.9'
89. Id. at 384.
90. Bates, 433 U.S. at 370.
91. l
92. Id. at 383-84.
93. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
94. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978).
95. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
96. Id. at 566.
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The fourth part of the test was later modified to require only a "reasonable
fit" between the asserted state interest and a restriction on commercial
speech.97
Subsequently, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to adopt a
similar four-part Central Hudson test in a situation that involved published
attorney advertising and the use of direct mailings.98 The case of In re
R.M.J. 99 involved a Missouri rule that limited the content of a lawyer's
advertisement to specific categories of information, and in some instances
specific language." The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the rule and
found that an attorney violated this rule when he included unsanctioned
language in a newspaper advertisement.'' However, the United States
Supreme Court, using the more exact Central Hudson test, found that the
Missouri rules unconstitutionally interfered with protected speech. 02 The
Court concluded that Missouri had not shown that an absolute prohibition
was necessary to cure any possible deception as required under the fourth
prong of the test."0 3
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,'°4 the Supreme Court
addressed the regulation of commercial speech by attorneys, and reaffirmed
the approach taken in In re R.M.J. In Zauderer, an Ohio attorney placed
two advertisements in a local newspaper. The first advertisement offered
representation for defendants in drunk driving cases, and a refund of the fee
if the client was convicted. 0 5 The second advertisement was directed to
women injured through the use of the Dalkon Shield and included an
accurate drawing of the birth control device. 0 6  Both advertisements
stated that cases would be handled on a contingent fee basis and if there
was no recovery, no legal fees would be owed.107
The Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel brought charges against the
attorney for misleading advertisements based on: (1) failure to disclose
regarding the cost and fee differentiation; (2) offering representation on a
contingent fee basis in a criminal case with respect to the drunk driving
97. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
98. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 197-98.
102. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205-06.
103. Id. at 207.
104. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
105. Id. at 629-30.
106. Id. at 630-31.
107. Id. at 631.
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advertisement; and (3) use of illustrations in attorney advertising with
respect to the Dalkon Shield advertisement and soliciting clients in
violation of Ohio rules.
10 8
Eight Supreme Court justices agreed that the Dalkon Shield advertise-
ment constituted commercial speech and that the Ohio rules were subject
to the tests set forth in Bates and In re R.M.J.1 9 Further, five justices
examined the rule against solicitation and found that the prohibition was
impermissible as applied to this advertisement because the statements
concerning the Dalkon Shield were neither false nor deceptive.10 For
similar reasons the Court struck down the blanket prohibition on illustra-
tions." Because the Court found that the advertisements were not
misleading, Ohio was forced to prove that the rules constituted the least
restrictive alternative necessary to prevent deception, which the state was
unable to do." 2
However, the Supreme Court did uphold the Ohio rules related to
disclosure requirements for legal fees and costs.'13 Applying a rational
basis test, the Court found that whenever the disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the state's interest in preventing deception, the
requirements should be upheld given the likelihood that consumers would
misunderstand the difference between legal fees and costs. 114 In addition,
the Court's opinion maintained the distinction between the two forms of
attorney commercial speech, solicitation and advertising, acknowledging
that even print advertisements are a form of solicitation. 1 5
The Supreme Court continued to extend protection for attorney
advertising in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association'1 6 by upholding an
attorney's right to send letters advertising his services to victims of
foreclosure." 7 The relevant state rule prohibited all targeted, direct mail
advertising in certain situations regardless of whether the court found it to
be false or misleading." 8  The Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky
108. Id. at 630-33.
109. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637-39 (Justice Powell took no part in the decision of the case).
110. Id. at 641-42.
111. Id. at 647.
112. Id. at 644.
113. Id. at 651-53.
114. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651-52.
115. Id. at 641-42.
116. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
117. Id. at 479-80.
118. Id. at 470 n.2. The pertinent rule provided in full:
A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual addressee only
if that addressee is one of a class of persons, other than a family, to whom it is also
1994]
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Supreme Court decision, holding that absolute prohibition on direct mail
advertising was violative of the First Amendment. 9 The United States
Supreme Court distinguished targeted, direct mail solicitation from in-
person solicitation because the former affords the consumer an opportunity
for reflection. 20 Once again, the Court emphasized that restrictions on
truthful, non-deceptive communication must be supported by a substantial
state interest.
Justice O'Connor's strong dissent criticized the majority's decision as
an unfortunate product of the Court's holding in Zauderer."' Using the
four-part Central Hudson test, Justice O'Connor supported granting states
"considerable latitude to ban advertising that is 'potentially or demonstrably
misleading,' as well as truthful advertising that undermines the substantial
governmental interest in promoting the high ethical standards that are
necessary in the legal profession."' Thus, Justice O'Connor would
permit states to ban all but the most minimal kinds of price advertising to
protect the dignity of the profession, and to curb possible attorney abuse of
their clients and justice system.
These three cases'23 illustrate the Supreme Court's emphasis on
consumer protection. The Court assessed the validity of state regulation by
balancing the benefits of more truthful information to the consumer against
the possibility of deception. 24  In making its decisions, the Court
analyzed both the content of the advertisement and the mode of communi-
cation.'25 The cases evidence a preference for greater disclosure and a
desire to avoid prophylactic rules when narrower regulations would
suffice. 26 In fact, the cases dealing with commercial speech can be
divided into two broad categories: (1) factually verifiable information,
presented within standardized and easily comparable units; and (2)
sent or delivered at or about the same time, and only if it is not prompted or
precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating to the addressee
or addressees as distinct from the general public.
Id.
119. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472.
120. Id. at 475-76; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978).
121. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 480-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 485 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982)) (emphasis omitted).
123. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
124. See generally Robert B. Reich, Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 775 (1979).
125. See Shapero, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982).
126. See Shapero, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982).
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subjective, non-verifiable information or information provided in a manner
that discourages comparison shopping. 27
Advertisements falling within the first category include the price
quotations in Bates, the listing of practice areas in In re R.M.J., the
illustrations in Zauderer, and the solicitation letters in Shapero. In each
case, the Court struck down the blanket restrictions in favor of a case-by-
case analysis.128  The Court emphasized the benefits to consumers that
flow from freer restrictions and the fact that the consumer would be able
to use the information in these advertisements to make a more informed
decision.'29  In each case, the state had taken a more paternalistic
approach, preferring to restrict a great deal of truthful advertisements in the
hopes of preventing possible deception.
In contrast, advertisements in the second category have no overriding
benefits for consumers. Although such advertisements increase the amount
of information available to the public, the information cannot be easily
verified and offers little value to a consumer engaged in comparison
shopping. In some cases, the manner of presentation, not the information
provided, warrants censure. For example, in Zauderer, the attorney's
failure to abide by state disclosure requirements subjected him to reprimand
because the manner of presentation left the consumer with an incomplete
picture of the product advertised, namely the price of his services.' The
Supreme Court found that in-person solicitation forces consumers to make
purchasing decisions without comparison shopping, thus falling into the
second category and justifying an absolute ban.' Because the forms of
commercial speech within this second category give rise to the greatest
possibility of deception, the Court tends to defer to the states and uphold
prophylactic rules, especially rules prohibiting solicitation for pecuniary
gain.1
127. See Reich, supra note 124, at 780.
128. See Shapero, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982).
129. See Shapero, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982).
130. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652.
131. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457, 467 (1978).
132. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641 (the Court reflected on the Ohralik decision).
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IV. EDENFIELD V. FANE
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Edenfield v. Fane,33 has
sparked heated discussion, some lawyers believing that the ruling in favor
of accounting professionals soliciting clients supports personal solicitation
by lawyers. However, in regard to attorney solicitation, further consider-
ations must be addressed. 134
A. The Facts
Plaintiff Scott Fane was a CPA licensed to practice in Florida.
135
Prior to moving to Florida, Fane had an accounting practice in New Jersey
where he often obtained clients by making unsolicited telephone calls
explaining his services.136 New Jersey law allowed this direct, personal,
and uninvited solicitation.
1 37
The Florida Board of Accountancy ("Board") had a comprehensive
rule prohibiting CPAs from engaging in the type of solicitation that Fane
had found most effective in New Jersey. 38 The Board's rules provided
that a CPA "shall not by any direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation solicit
an engagement to perform public accounting services ... where the
engagement would be for a person or entity not already a client of [the
CPA], unless such person or entity has invited such a communication."'
' 39
"'[D]irect, in-person, uninvited solicitation' means 'any communication
which directly or implicitly requests an immediate oral response from the
recipient,' which, under the Board's rules, includes all '[u]ninvited in-
person visits or conversations or telephone calls to a specific potential
client., , , 14
Fane brought this action against the Board in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief on the ground that the Board's anti-solicitation rule
violated the First Amendment, inter alia.14' The District Court ordered
133. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
134. See infra part V.




139. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 21A-24.002(2)(c) (1992)).
140. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1796.
141. Id. at 1797.
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summary judgment in favor of Fane, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and
the United States Supreme Court, granting certiorari, also affirmed. 42
B. Analysis
Initially, the United States Supreme Court determined that this type
of personal solicitation is commercial expression entitled to First Amend-
ment protection, while acknowledging that an earlier opinion had upheld
a ban on in-person solicitation by lawyers.'43 As in the previously
discussed attorney advertising cases, the Court stressed the desires of the
consumer and that "solicitation may have considerable value [because it]
allows spontaneous communication between buyer and seller."' 44  The
Court stated that "[i]n denying CPAs and their clients these advantages,
Florida's law threatens societal interests in broad access to complete and
accurate commercial information that First Amendment coverage of
commercial speech is designed to safeguard."'
145
The Court applied the Central Hudson test to determine whether the
law restricting personal solicitation by CPAs was reasonably tailored to
serve a substantial state interest, thus passing First Amendment scruti-
ny. 14  The Court's inquiry included: (1)"whether the State's interests in
proscribing [personal solicitation] are substantial; [(2)] whether the
challenged regulation advances these interests in a direct and material way;
and [(3)] whether the extent of the restriction on protected speech is in
reasonable proportion to the interests served."'147
1. Prong One
In undertaking the first query, the Court accepted the State's interests
as proffered by the Board. 48  "First, the Board asserted an interest in
protecting consumers from fraud or overreaching by CPAs.'49 Second,
the Board claimed that its ban is necessary to maintain both the fact and
appearance of CPA independence in auditing a business and attesting to its








149. Id. at 1799.
150. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1799.
1994]
18 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15
tial interest in ensuring the accuracy of commercial information, preventing
deception and fraud, as well as maintaining standards of ethical conduct in
licensed professions."'
2. Prong Two: The Determinative Prong
The second prong of Central Hudson "requires that a regulation
impinging upon commercial expression 'directly advance the state interest
involved; ... [an] ineffective or remote support for the government's
purpose'" will not suffice. 152 As such, the state's burden of justifying the
restriction cannot be satisfied by speculation. The state "must demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction[s] will in fact
alleviate" those harms.
1 53
The Court found that the Board's concerns were unjustifiable based
on Fane's actions because the Board was unable to prove that a ban on
CPA solicitation would promote its asserted interests in any substantial
manner.154 The Board failed to introduce any studies that could suggest
that personal solicitation of prospective clients by CPAs would lead to
fraud or overreaching.15 5 Further, the Board's records failed to disclose
any evidence from other states to back its contention although twenty-one
states placed no specific restrictions on CPA solicitations.56 Thus,
having failed this prong of the Central Hudson test the Court was unable
to uphold the rule prohibiting CPA solicitation.
5 7
3. The Board's Prophylactic Rule Contention in the Alternative
Relying on Ohralik, the Board argued in the alternative that the
solicitation ban could be justified as a prophylactic rule. 58 The Board
acknowledged that while Fane's solicitations may not have involved any
misconduct, "all personal solicitation by CPAs must be banned, because




152. Id. at 1800.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1803.
155. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1801-02.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1801-02.
158. Id. at 1802.
159. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1802.
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But, the Court rejected the Board's argument because "Ohralik does
not stand for the proposition that blanket bans on personal solicitation by
all types of professionals are constitutional in all circumstances., 160 The
holding in Ohralik was narrow and depended upon certain unique features
of in-person solicitation by attorneys. The Court stated, "the constitution-
ality of a ban on personal solicitation will depend upon the identity of the
parties and the precise circumstances of the solicitation., 16' Further, the
Court clearly stated that a prohibitive rule was justified in rare situations
"inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct,"
such as in the case of a lawyer personally soliciting an unsophisticated,
injured or distressed lay person. 62
In Fane, the clients, solicited initially by telephone, would subse-
quently meet with the CPA in their own offices at a time of their
choosing. 63 If the potential clients were unreceptive to this initial
telephone contact, they could terminate the call. Invasion of privacy was
not a significant concern where the prospective client had an existing
professional relationship with an accountant. The prospective client is far
less susceptible to manipulation than the young accident victim in
Ohralik.'" In contrast to Fane, the clients in Ohralik were approached
at a "moment of high stress and vulnerability" and were thus much more
prone to manipulation by a soliciting attorney trained in the art of
persuasion.1 65 In Fane, the Court found that "[t]he Board's reliance on
Ohralik was misplaced ....,66 Instead, the Court held tight to the
opinion that "[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are
suspect" and that "a State may not curb protected expression without
advancing a substantial governmental interest."' 67
4. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
In Fane, Justice O'Connor reiterated her dissent in Bates where she
postulated that the Court's past decisions increasingly have led to
"unprofessional forms of attorney advertising being protected speech.1 68
In explicitly addressing the issue of attorney advertising in her dissent,
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447, 464).
163. Id. at 1803.
164. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1803.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1803-04.
168. Id. at 1804.
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Justice O'Connor stated, "I see no constitutional difference between a rule
prohibiting in-person solicitation by attorneys, and a rule prohibiting in-
person solicitation by [CPAs].' 69
Relying on past cases dealing with advertising, Justice O'Connor
maintained that the Court's focus was too narrow in its determination that
advertisement was protected speech with the exception of speech found to
be misleading, false, amounting to overreaching, invasion of privacy, or
exercising undue influence.1 70 Justice O'Connor also stated, "the States
have the broader authority to prohibit commercial speech that, albeit not
directly harmful to the listener, is inconsistent with the speaker's member-
ship in a learned profession and therefore damaging to the profession and
society at large."'71  Justice O'Connor asserted that certain forms of
typical competition in the business world may be prohibited because "pure
profit seeking degrades the public-spirited culture of the profession," and
that commercialization has a profound effect on the profession.1
72
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor directly contended that the majority in
Fane avoided analyzing the Florida rule under the Central Hudson test
altogether, claiming instead that the majority characterized Fane's suit as
an "as-applied" challenge. 73 The result, as Justice O'Connor sees it, is
that a commercial speaker can claim First Amendment protection for
particular instances of prohibited commercial speech even where the
prohibitory law satisfies the Central Hudson test. 74 Thus, the majority
implied that the Central Hudson itself was satisfied which should have led
to a reversal of the judgment of the court of appeals and upholding the
Florida law. 1
75
V. EDENFIELD V. FANE'S EFFECT ON ATrORNEY ADVERTISING
Currently, a key issue is whether states are required to follow the
Supreme Court's previous rulings that states may only impose measures
necessary to prevent false, misleading or deceptive advertising, or whether
the more aggressive approach followed by Iowa and other states will pass
169. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1805.
170. Id. at 1803.
171. Id. at 1804; see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 676-77; Shapero, 486 U.S. at 488-91; Peel
v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
172. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1804 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792).
173. Id. at 1805.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1806.
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constitutional scrutiny.'76 The following is an example of a more
restrictive state rule regarding attorney advertising and an analysis of its
constitutionality under the advertising cases.
A. Iowa's Advertising Rules
The Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers ("Iowa
Code"), considered among the most restrictive in the United States,
includes a general provision prohibiting "false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, self-laudatory, or unfair statement[s]" in advertising.' The
Iowa Code also contains an exclusive "safe harbor" listing of permissible
methods of disseminating such advertising.' Such methods include the
general use of the print media and telephone directories, however the Iowa
Code specifically prohibits all in-person solicitation.'79 Written solicita-
tion, which includes direct mailing, is permitted under very limited
circumstances. 80 The Iowa Code also contains a provision allowing for
176. Id. at 1802-04.
177. IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS Canon 2 DR 2-101(A)
(1989).
178. Id. at DR 2-101(B). The Iowa Code states in pertinent part:
(1) General Print Media. Lawyer advertising may be communicated to the public
in newspapers, periodicals, trade journals, "shoppers", [sic] and other similar
advertising media, published and disseminated in the geographic area in which the
lawyer maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele
resides, PROVIDED THAT the publisher agrees in writing to print all the
disclaimers required by these rules in type size not smaller than 9-point on each
page bearing the ad.
(2) Lawyer Telephone and City Directory Listings. A lawyer licensed to practice
law in Iowa may permit the inclusion of the lawyer's name, address, telephone
number, and designation as a lawyer, in a telephone or city directory, subject to the
following requirements.
(a) Alphabetical Listings. The lawyer's name, address, and telephone
number and designation as a lawyer, only, may be listed alphabetically in the
residential, business, and classified sections of the telephone or city
directory.
(b) Classified Listings. Listings in the classified section shall be under the
general heading "Lawyers" or "Attorneys" except that a lawyer who has
complied with DR 2-105(A)(4) [compliance reporting regarding hours
devoted to a particular field] may be listed in no more than three classifica-
tions or headings identifying those fields or areas of practice as listed in DR
2-105(A)(2) ....
(c) Display and Box Advertisements. All other telephone or city directory
advertising permitted by these rules, including display or box advertisements,
shall include the disclosures required by DR 2-101(A), (D), and (F), unless
such disclosures are published as provided in DR 2-101(B)(1).
Id. (emphasis added).
179. Id. at DR 2-101(B)(4).
180. Id. The Iowa Code states in pertinent part:
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the limited use of restricted radio and television communication, as well as
biographical and informational brochures."8' Moreover, the advertising
(b) Written Solicitation. A lawyer who wishes to engage in written solicitation by
direct mail to persons or groups of persons who may be in need of specific or
particular legal services because of a condition or occurrence which is known or
could upon reasonable inquiry be known to the soliciting lawyer shall, prior to the
dissemination of the solicitation, file all such proposed written documents or
solicitations with the Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa
State Bar Association. The soliciting lawyer shall, in addition thereto, bear the
burden of proof regarding:
(i) the truthfulness of all facts contained in the proposed communication;
(ii) how the identity and specific legal need of the potential recipient were
discovered; and
(iii) how the identity and knowledge of the specific need of the potential
recipient were verified by the soliciting lawyer.
All such written solicitations shall contain the disclosures required by DR 2-101(A),
(D), and (F). No such dissemination shall be made until the committee or its
designee shall, upon the facts presented, render a written finding that the solicitation
is not false, deceptive, or misleading. No information disseminated by the soliciting
lawyer shall make any reference to such submission and finding. Each separate
written solicitation intended for dissemination must be submitted for a finding in
accordance herewith.
(c) Direct Mail. Information permitted by these rules may be communicated by
direct mail to the general public other than persons or groups of persons who may
be in need of specific or particular legal services because of a condition or
occurrence which is known or could with reasonable inquiry be known to the
advertising lawyer. All such communications shall contain the disclosures required
by DR 2-101(A),(D), and (F).
(d) All communications authorized by paragraphs "b" and "c" hereof and the
envelope containing the same shall, in addition to other disclosures that may be
required hereunder, carry the following disclosure in red ink in 9-point or larger
type: "ADVERTISEMENT ONLY". [sic] A copy of all direct mail communica-
tions shall be filed with the... Iowa State Bar Association... contemporaneously
with the mailing of the communications to the general public and shall contain the
disclosures required by DR 2-101(A),(D), and (F).
Id. (emphasis added).
181. Id. DR 2-101(B)(5) and (6). The Iowa Code states in pertinent part:
(5) Electronic Media. Information permitted by these rules, articulated only by a
single nondramatic voice, not that of the lawyer, and with no other background
sound, may be communicated by radio or television, or other electronic or
telephonic media. In the case of television, no visual display shall be allowed
except that allowed in print as articulated by the announcer. All such communica-
tions to the extent possible, shall be made only in the geographic area in which the
lawyer maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele
resides, and shall contain the disclosures required by DR 2-101(A),(D), and (F) and
DR 2-105 (A)(3).
(6) Biographical and Informational Brochures. Brochures or pamphlets containing
biographic and informational data as permitted by these rules, shall only be
disseminated directly to clients, members of the Bar, or in response to direct




lawyer has the obligation to retain records of all information communicated
through all permissible means of advertising." 2
Advocates of this more restrictive approach to attorney advertising are
delighted that Iowa's advertising rules, specifically electronic media
advertising, circumvented the Supreme Court's inquiry as to their
constitutionality, and stand based on the Court's finding of lack of federal
question jurisdiction.
18 3
The case of Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey'8
4
originated in 1982 when three attorneys aired unauthorized advertisements
on a television station in Des Moines, Iowa." 5 After three days, at the
request of the State Ethics Committee, the station discontinued the
advertisements. The Committee then commenced an action to enjoin the
attorneys from using the ads based on violations of the Professional
Canons, specifically, DR 2-101 and DR 2-105.186 The attorneys counter-
claimed, asserting that the rules violated the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the U.S. Constitution.
1 1
7
Subsequently, the case reached the Iowa Supreme Court which held
the rules permissible. The Iowa court relied heavily on the Zauderer
opinion in making its determination. The court contrasted the two cases
finding that "special problems" exist in the field of electronic advertising,
thus "warrant[ing] a special rule to regulate lawyer advertising in the
182. DR 2-101(13)(7). The Iowa Code states in pertinent part:
(7) Record Retention. Whether or not it contains fee information, a lawyer shall
preserve a copy of each advertisement placed in a newspaper, the classified section
of the telephone or city directory, or periodical, and a tape of the radio, television,
or other electronic or telephonic media commercial, or recording, for at least three
years and a record of the date or dates... and name of the medium through which
it was aired..
Id. (emphasis added).
183. Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986).
184. 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986) (dismissed for want
of substantial federal question).
185. One of the commercials featured an actor and actress portraying a doctor and a nurse
in an examination room. While the nurse peers at an X-ray, the doctor says:
We see first hand injuries caused by the neglect of others. If you're seriously
injured through the negligence of others, you should be talking to a lawyer. The
choice of lawyer could be important. That's something to think about.
All of the commercials featured an actress portraying a receptionist in a law office who says:
If you're injured through the negligence of others, call the law firm of Humphrey,
Haas & Gritzner. Cases involving auto accidents, workers' comp, serious personal
injury and wrongful death handled on a percentage basis. No charge for initial
consultation. Call now at 288-0102.
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565, 566 (Iowa 1984).
186. See supra note 178 for specific language.
187. Committee, 355 N.W.2d at 566-67.
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[television] media."18  The court also stated that the use of electronic
advertising presented a very strong potential for abuse, justifying its
regulation.189 As such, the court determined that it was in the interest of
the public to allow the rule to stand.190
B. The Advertising Cases Applied to the Iowa Code
The result in Humphrey may have been very different if the relevant
rule had been analyzed by the Supreme Court and scrutinized under Bates
and its progeny, as well as Fane.
1. Central Hudson Applied to Humphrey
Relying on the Central Hudson test, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld
the relevant rules as constitutional based upon "special problems" that are
inherent in the field of electronic advertising. 9' Notwithstanding the fact
that the court's opinion seemed very result oriented, the court stated that
electronic advertising lay closer to in-person solicitation than to written
advertising deemed permissible in Shapero.92
In determining that electronic advertising was more akin to in-person
solicitation, the Iowa court stated that once an individual is bombarded with
a television commercial, the listener or viewer has lost his opportunity,
supposedly accorded only to the reader of printed advertisements, to pause
and restudy, and to thoughtfully consider.193 This forced intrusion upon
an individual's senses presents a strong potential for abuse because the
advertisement's purpose is to incite the listener to make an immediate
phone call. In addition, such advertisements are much more difficult to
regulate than printed advertisements which are easier to document and to
188. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 645.
189. Id. at 647.
190. Id. The case was subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme Court where it
was dismissed for want of substantial federal question, thus eluding the constitutionality inquiry.
475 U.S. 1114 (1986).
191. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 645-46.
192. Id. at 646. It was apparent from the language of the opinion that the Iowa Supreme
Court carried strong feelings about violating the attorney advertising rules as promulgated. The
court made a distinction between the dissemination of protected information and "crass personal
promotion," exposing a strong bias against attorney advertising. Id. at 647. In fact the court
stated, "the rule provides only for the regulation of a form of advertising which is recognized as
ripe for abuse. We have no apologies to make for our rule. We believe it to be decidedly in the
interest of the public in the state we serve." Id. (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 646.
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preserve. However, these arguments, reeking of anti-advertising bias, are
weak in their basis.
The more accurate inference is that electronic advertising is more akin
to printed communication than to in-person solicitation. In Shapero, the
Court stated that targeted, direct-mail solicitation "'pose[d] much less risk
of overreaching or undue influence' than does in-person solicitation....
[Written communication does not involve 'the coercive force of the
personal presence of a trained advocate' or the 'pressure on the potential
client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representa-
tion."" 94  Further, written communication conveys information about
legal services that are more conducive to reflection and the exercise of
choice on the part of the consumer.'95 The opinion in Shapero relied
heavily on the language from Zauderer, which strongly contrasted written
communication with in-person solicitation. 6 The Shapero Court found
that personalized direct-mail solicitation, although presenting attorneys with
opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes, does not justify a total ban on
that mode of protected speech. 9 7 Thus, it is apparent that the rule at
issue in Shapero did not meet the Central Hudson test.
Similarly, the pertinent rule in Humphrey would not meet the Central
Hudson test for the following reasons. The Court in Shapero relied on the
fact that the consumer would not be forced to make an immediate decision
regarding the attorney's services because of the lack of coercion based on
personal presence of the attorney. Such is also the case here in dealing
with a television commercial, assuming that the commercial is protected
commercial speech, and not deceptive or misleading. The individual
subjected to a commercial advertising an attorney's services has the option
of turning the channel versus listening and watching the advertisement.
The viewer is not bombarded with information that could force him to
unwillingly make a phone call. Even if the individual stays tuned to the
commercial, the individual would not feel any pressure to make any type
of decision regarding the attorney's services. Just because the advertise-
ment is not written does not mean that the viewer has lost his opportunity
to thoughtfully consider the options. On the contrary, it is just as likely
that a person viewing a commercial will be able to tune out the information
that he finds irrelevant. If this were not the case, there would likely be a
194. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626).
195. Id. at 476.
196. Id. at 475-77.
197. Id. at 476.
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strong case against home shopping networks "forcing" viewers to spend
money against their free will, arguably due to the consumers' inability to
thoughtfully consider their options.
There is very little risk of overreaching or undue influence via
televised attorney advertising. All the watcher has to do is turn the
channel. Although there may be a small chance for isolated abuses causing
the listener to be misled or deceived, the risk is not great enough to justify
a prohibition of television advertising. Iowa should regulate against such
potential abuses through more precise means, especially when the
regulation has the potential to infringe upon the valuable free flow of
commercial speech. One possible method of specific regulation is a closer
monitoring by the State Ethics Committee for "actual" harm potentially
evident in commercials.
In this case, the commercial did not comply exactly with the Iowa
Code. But there is little evidence that strict compliance is necessary to
prevent deception as required under Central Hudson. The fact that the
truthful and accurate commercial was merely deemed a dramatization by
the Iowa Bar Association Ethics Committee in violation of the rule does
not support a complete ban on such advertising.
2. Fane Reexamined: Attorney Solicitation
The holding in Fane has a very narrow application; a prohibition on
in-person solicitation by CPAs is inconsistent with the free speech
guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendment.198 However, the
majority opinion wasted no time in addressing the issue of attorney
advertising. 199 The Court differentiated between the solicitation of a CPA
and that of an attorney, leaving open the strong possibility that a similar
prohibition on attorney advertising would meet the Central Hudson test and
thus be upheld.2 °
In order to defeat the Florida rule prohibiting solicitation, the Fane
Court relied heavily on the language in Ohralik to distinguish a CPA from
a lawyer:
The potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a
lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally
solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.
Such an individual may place his trust in a lawyer, regardless of
198. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1796.
199. Id. at 1802-03.
200. Id.
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the latter's qualifications or the individual's actual need for legal
representation, simply in response to persuasion under circum-
stances conducive to uninformed acquiescence. Although it is
argued that personal solicitation is valuable because it may
apprise a victim of misfortune of his legal rights, the very plight
of that person not only makes him more vulnerable to influence
but also may make advice all the more intrusive. Thus, under
these adverse conditions the overtures of an uninvited lawyer
may distress the solicited individual simply because of their
obtrusiveness and the invasion of the individual's privacy, even
when no other harm materializes. Under such circumstances, it
is not unreasonable for the State to presume that in-person
solicitation by lawyers more often than not will be injurious to
the person solicited.20'
From this language, it is apparent that a court could easily find the Central
Hudson test satisfied because in-person solicitation by an attorney would
be considered inherently misleading. Thus, if the advertising rule at issue
in Humphrey was analyzed under Fane, it would appear that the television
commercials that violated the Iowa Code would probably not be protected
under the First Amendment if it could be shown that electronic advertising
was more like in-person solicitation than written advertisements. On the
other hand, the Iowa rules relating to electronic media could be found too
prohibitive, and thus unconstitutional, if television advertising were found
to be closer to the written expression of information found constitutionally
protected in Shapero.
Nevertheless, it is possible that Edenfield v. Fane has opened the
doors for professional advertising to be given more First Amendment
protection, unless there is evidence of deception or fraud. For example, the
Court in Fane held that prophylactic rules against solicitation are not
justified in a business context where the solicitation is not inherently
conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct.2" Further,
upon application of the Central Hudson test, the Court in Fane found that
the prohibition on advertising did not advance the state interest of
protecting against overreaching and fraud in any direct and material
manner. 3 The Supreme Court has never upheld a similar prophylactic
prohibition under the Central Hudson test because of the difficulty in
proving that such a rule has actually advanced the state's interests in a
201. Id. at 1802 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1978)).
202. Id. at 1803-04.
203. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1801-02.
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material way and that the rule is the least restrictive means of protecting the
state's substantial interests.2°
Thus, the trend of restrictive state advertising rules may be coming to
a halt. If the Supreme Court is given the opportunity to address state
attorney advertising prohibitions in the near future, it is unlikely that any
such prohibition will withstand the Central Hudson test.' °5
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
It appears that the problem with attorney advertising arises in the
context of "unprofessional" advertising and the impact such advertising has
on the image of the profession.2' It is also evident from history that the
problems of attorney advertising were not perceived as severe until
economics became an isgue. °  An excess of lawyers and a lack of
business has sparked the urgency to procure clients by any means
necessary. Thus, the catalyst behind "unprofessional" advertising is the
attorneys need to make a living.
It seems that bar associations are attempting to solve the problem of
"unprofessional" advertising by prohibiting advertising altogether. This is
based on the ideology that law is a profession, not a business. However,
the problem really begins with the law schools which are allowed to
operate under the business guise. The reality is that the nation's law
schools are aware of attorney glut, yet continue to accept and "process"
many students every year into an already saturated profession, thereby
increasing the need for attorneys to use aggressive methods in order to earn
a living. These methods ultimately include advertising in a variety of
different forms: television, billboards, direct mailings, and even in-person
solicitation. Upon graduation, law students are thrust into a profession that
holds its image and decorum as sacred, not to be tarnished by the need to
204. See Shapero, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982).
205. A number of states, namely Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, and New
Mexico, have adopted rules that seek to severely restrain the types and extent of lawyer
advertising. These states have taken it upon themselves to halt the supposed detrimental effects
that some attorney advertising has on the profession as the public perceives it by intensifying their
laws against such advertising. See ARIZ. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT ER 7.1 to 7.4
(1992); FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Chapter 4 Rule 4-7.1 to 4-7.8 (1992); IOWA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBILrrY FOR LAWYERS Canon 2 DR 2-101 to 2-105 (1992);
Miss. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 to 7.5 (1992); NaV. SUPREME COURT RULES
Rule 195 to 199 (1992); N.M. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 16-701 to 707 (1992).
206. See generally supra part I.
207. See generally supra part II.C.
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earn a living. It is at this time that the profession holds itself out as above
trades and expects it's members to act accordingly. But why shouldn't a
law school be subjected to the same constraints as a newly practicing
attorney? Why is the school able to put economics above the "good of the
profession?" The obvious answer is that law schools should be subject to
the same traditional and historical regulations as the profession itself. State
bar associations should regulate the perceived problem of advertising at the
beginning, and not at the end, by strongly encouraging the nation's law
schools to personally address the problem of attorney glut.
A radical solution would be the regulation of law school admissions.
Otherwise, the burden is on the little guy to survive in a profession whose
members have historically relied on reputation and word of mouth for
success. The reality now is that it is almost impossible to succeed relying
solely on such a passive method. The burden should ultimately be on the
entity most able to correct the problem, law schools. If the consequence
is down-sizing in order to protect the hallowed image of the profession,
then that is the sacrifice that must be made. Thus, if the bar associations
are going to regulate anything, it should be the law schools that are taking
students' money and putting them out on the street with a dismal prospect
of finding work. It is here that the profession begins its regulation of
"professional conduct." However, the law schools have a duty as well tQ
act professionally. If economics is not a proper component of the
profession, then it follows that it should not be fundamental to the study of
law either.
For those concerned with the perceived image problem, the reputation
of the legal profession can be adequately protected on a case-by-case basis.
Advertisements that are misleading can be regulated through the state bar,
while those that are only distasteful will be left to the judgment of the
consumer. An attorney who generates such an advertisement takes the risk
that the consumer will either be overly suspicious of the quality of services
offered or will ignore the advertisement completely. Further, attorneys who
do not provide quality service may be driven out of the market by the
demand of expending significant resources in an ongoing effort to produce
new clients rather than thriving on repeat and referral business. These
factors and the realities of economic pressures and commercial life require
the recognition of legal services as a market commodity and the removal
of any distinctions between legal advertising and other forms of commercial
speech.
Currently, advertising is regulated under the auspices of protecting the
prospective client from being misled, and protecting against overreaching
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by soliciting lawyers. As such, most state bar associations now have a
monitoring or disciplinary system concerned with attorney advertising.
Some state bar associations are devoting a great deal of effort to
reviewing and regulating advertising. In fact, several state bar associations
have included within their ethics rules provisions that mandate attorneys to
submit their advertisements to an advertising committee set up to give
advisory opinions and check compliance prior to dissemination. Two
questions arise at this point: What criteria are these committee members
using to determine whether an advertisement is permissible? Is the
committee making a value judgment when viewing a potential television
commercial or are they only concerned with general compliance with state
rules? With restriction, there will always be enforcement problems, thus
the consumer should make the ultimate decision.
Of course, ethical rules must be in place to regulate such lawyer
conduct. However, the resources of the state bar associations may be better
utilized in areas of malpractice and fraud than in the area of legitimate
advertising. In fact, these resources which the bar associations are
expending could be put to better use, such as helping lawyers to advertise
in a more responsible manner instead of restricting all advertising. This
could be accomplished by state bar associations designing advertising
models for use by their attorneys.
Furthermore, a variety of laws are in place to protect the consumer
against deceit regarding the nature and quality of goods and services. So
why not allow attorneys to advertise their services subject to the current
laws regarding advertising? The Federal Trade Commission Acte°8
protects against deceptive trade practices which include false or misleading
advertising. In addition, states have also enacted legislation to protect the
consumer. Thus, states and bar associations could relax their restrictive
advertising rules and allow attorneys to be subject to the current consumer
laws. It would follow that if the advertisement is not misleading, but
merely deemed "unprofessional," the market can deal with the attorney in
the way that it sees fit. Caveat emptor.
VII. CONCLUSION
A discriminating group of attorneys in the United States would like
to advance their belief that the legal profession is a very selective society.
In that respect, these attorneys, most of whom are employed in large firms,
wish to continue in their belief that law is not a commercial profession, but
208. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988).
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rather a dignified, moral, and passive profession which is not synonymous
with a commercial venture. These attorneys view lawyer advertising as the
cause of the profession's negative image. Further, these attorneys view
advertising as a tool only necessary for the lower echelon of attorneys. As
such, the debate has also intensified the inherent conflict between the
interests of disparate segments of the legal profession.
The Supreme Court decisions in the area of advertising support the
proposition that states should be required to prove deception before they are
permitted to ban any form of advertising. The Court encourages the
dissemination of more information and procedures that ban only actually
misleading advertisements. Although the Supreme Court has not actually
addressed many forms of advertising, including broadcast media, prior
decisions demand that states abandon absolute bans and extensive
restrictions. This ideology would better serve society."
No longer is our society one of small, stagnant communities.
Attorneys of the past were able to build a strong practice based on their
reputation, character, and training. Attorneys were fewer in number and
did not have to advertise to earn a living. However, times have changed
drastically. Today, many attorneys do not want to admit that the legal
profession has matured into a business. Those who strongly oppose this
transition hold a false concern for the traditional ways, couched in concern
for the profession. Historically, it appears that those opposing competi-
tiveness within the profession were more concerned with their relationships
with other attorneys and the potential loss of intimacy once a member of
this select fraternity began plotting to steal another's clients and blowing
their professional horn through advertising.
Nevertheless, the fear remains that through advertising the image of
the profession will deteriorate to such an extent that attorneys will be
scorned by non-attorneys as "unprofessional." Yet what is so unprofes-
sional about profit seeking? We live in a capitalistic society made strong
by its competitive spirit. Why then would one segment of this society
choose not to participate in capitalism for the sole purpose of keeping with
tradition and maintaining passive and patient lawyers?
We must remember that lawyers were historically passive and patient.
They did not advertise for clients because advertising was unnecessary and
attorneys were few in number and usually from wealthy families who did
not depend on their profession for their livelihood. These young men
actually held disdain for all forms of trade and competition because they
considered themselves, as did society, an elite group of intellectuals. Thus,
attorneys were able to remain demure while practicing for the public good
and ignoring competition.
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Increased access to legal services through advertising enables
attorneys to better serve the community and may actually increase respect
for the legal profession. Advertising can be useful in communicating to
consumers, truthful, and sometimes necessary, information about the legal
system, as well as the availability of legal services. We should encourage
the flow of information which ultimately fosters choice.
Allowing attorneys to advertise is unlikely to impact the profession's
"negative" image. Further, attorney advertising has not been clearly found
to harm the public image of attorneys. Thus, if more good can be
accomplished through advertising - more access to legal aid for the
majority - then it appears that the profession has done its job and should
not be so concerned with attorney advertising which has not been clearly
found to harm the public image of attorneys.
